REQUESTS FOR PROPOSALS IN STATE
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
The 1970's saw an unprecedented increase in procurement
expenditures by state and local governments.' Twenty years ago,
federal procurement expenditures 2 exceeded state and local purchasing by about $7 billion each year.3 With the inception in the
late 1960's of various grant-in-aid and revenue-sharing programs,4
state and local government purchases began to exceed those of the
federal government.3 By 1980, state and local procurement expenditures exceeded federal expenditures by more than $135 billion.8
Despite this dramatic shift from the federal government to the
states, most state procurement laws and regulations remain unchanged. 7 These laws were generally enacted over fifty years ago,"
prior to the increases in volume, sophistication, and technological
complexity of present state procurements. 9

I BunAu or EcoN. ANArYsls, U.S. DEP'T OF Com-mmcin, 1977 Bvsnims
STAT SIcs 2 (21st biennial ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Busnxmss STAnsTncS];
61 BunAtu OF EcoN. ANALYSIS, U.S. Dm,'T oF ComMECE, No. 6, SuRvEY or CURENT BusN ms 12 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CunmU.T BusInEss]. The following
data culled from these reports indicate the dramatic economic shift from federal to
state and local procurement;
Government Purchasesof Goods and Services
(Billions of CurrentDollars)
Year
Federal
State and Local
1960
53.7
46:5
1970
95.6
123.2
1980
198.9
335.8
1981 (estimate)
219.4
357.7
Although federal purchasing has increased fourfold since 1960, state and local
purchasing has increased eightfold and now exceeds it by $135 billion annually.
2A]l references in this Comment to "federal procurement expenditures" include
national defense purchases.
8 Busn;ss STATnSICS, supra note 1, at 2.
4 See Keyes, Some Approaches Toward a Uniform Code for State and Local
Government Procurement--A Condition Ripe for a Solution, 6 Ur.B. LAw. 763,
765 n.1 (1974).
5 THE CouNcrL OF SrAa Gov'Ts, STATE AND LocAL. CoVym mNT PRmCnASNr
1.1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as STATE PURcnAswo].
6 See supranote 1.
7See infra text accompanying note 66 and infra Appendix IL See also STATE
PtmcHAsING, supra note 5, at 1.2.
s Short, Developments in State Purchasing,in 23 Boon OF
at 213, 215 (The Council of State Governments ed. 1980).
9 Id. 217.
(179)

TE STATES

1980-81,

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

180

[Vol. 130:179'

The need for fundamental state procurement law reform was,
recognized in the early 1970's, 10 and the American Bar Association
responded by beginning to develop a model code." These efforts
culminated in 1979, when the ABA House of Delegates ratified the
Model Procurement Code for State and Local Governments (theCode).' 2 As of November 1981, eight states have enacted legislation
based largely on that Code. 13
The Model Procurement Code represents a significant improvement upon most current state laws, but it does not scrutinize all
aspects of state procurement processes with the same thoroughness.'
Most importantly, the Model Procurement Code leaves the process
of competitive negotiation ' largely undefined.' 6
'0 See, e.g., Falvey, Birnkrant & Friedman, ABA Proposes Legislative Adoption
of a Model Procurement Code for State and Local Governments, 11 UtB. LAw.
481 (1979); Hiestand, Blueprint for Improving Public Procurement, CONT. MGMT.,
Apr. 1979, at 6; Keyes, The Need for a Model Code on Purchasing by State and
Local Governments, 43 PA. B.A.Q. 73 (1971); Keyes, supra note 4; vom Baur,
The Project for a Model Procurement Code, 8 Put. CoNT. L.J. 4, 4-6 (1976);
Assn. Recommends Study of Model Procurement Code for Pa., Pa. L.J.-Rep., Jan12, 1981, at 2, col. 2.
11
vom Baur, supranote 10, at 6-7.
1

2 MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Vi

[hereinafter cited as

(1979

y

MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE].

13 Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, South Carolina,

and Utah have enacted Model Procurement Code-based legislation. The executive
or the legislative branches in twenty-two other states are considering the adoption
of all or part of the Code. See Model Procurement Code Project, Summary of
Legislative Activity (September 1, 1981); infra Appendix II.
14The Model Procurement Code has not gone uncriticized. For example, the
National Association of State Purchasing Officials has criticized its proposed organizational alternatives and recommends adherence to existing structures wherever
possible. See Short, supra note 8, at 215-16.
15 See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
16 The Model Procurement Code provides for a kind of competitive negotiation
process, termed "competitive sealed proposals." MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE, supra
note 12, § 3-203. But the circumstances under which a procurement officer may
avoid the stated preference for formal advertising (competitive bidding), id. § 3-201,
and resort to negotiations to let the contract are indefinite and elusive.
(1) Conditions for Use. When, under regulations promulgated by
the Policy Office, the Chief Procurement Officer, the head of a Purchasing
Agency, or a designee of either officer above the level of the Procurement
Officer determines in writing that the use of competitive sealed bidding
is either not practicable or not advantageous to the [State], a contract may
be entered into by competitive sealed proposals. The Policy Office may
provide by regulation that it is either not practicable or not advantageous to
the [State] to procure specified types of supplies, services, or construction
by competitive sealed bidding.
Id. § 3-203(1). This provision essentially leaves the decision whether to employ
"competitive sealed proposals" to procurement officers, who are to be guided by
unspecified regulations and the expansive standards of "practicability" or "advantageousness."
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Competitive negotiation is very different from the standard
public contracting method of competitive sealed bidding, which
prohibits discussions between the government and all bidders, and
permits consideration only of price in contract awards. 17 In competitive negotiation, the government solicits design and price proposals
from, and conducts negotiations with, suppliers ' 8 in order to ascertain the best overall proposal in terms of both price and quality.1 0
Competitive negotiation is generally employed by the government
to purchase sophisticated technology 2 that is produced by a limited
number of suppliers and cannot be readily defined by precise
specifications.

21

The importance of negotiated procurement is evident from the
marked trend toward its use. 22

Despite federal statutory 23 and

24

regulatory provisions that require competitive bidding to be the
primary contracting method, 85-90%0 of all federal contract dollars,
amounting to over $175 billion in 1980, were let through negotiated
procurements.m Unfortunately, similar data on state government
practices are not available. 2 If, however, one speculates that negotiated procurement accounts for 10%o of all state procurement spend17MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE,

supra note 12,

§ 3-202(5) commentary (4).

Is Nash & Love, Innovations in Federal Construction Contracting, 45 GEO.
WAsH. L. REv. 309, 324 (1977).
For a broad definition of negotiation, see J.
WHEr.L
& R. PAsLE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COTrMACTS 178, 179-80 (1975).
For an excellent, concise comparison of competitive bidding and negotiated procurement, see P. Snqrrm, C OVEaNmENT CONTRacT BiDDinG 20-22 (1976).
'9 See Nash & Love, supra note 18, at 324, 332 & n.47. Negotiation is preferred when "[tihe comparability between initial offers . .. is insufficient to judge
the relative merits on the basis of ... price [alone]." J. WHELN
& R. PAsI °,
supra note 18, at 179; see also id. 181.
20 See vom Baur & Del Duca, State and Local Procurement,in DEVELOPMENTS
iN GovEMrENT CoNTRAcT LAw 1977 at 287, 297 (M. Doke ed. 1978).
2
1 Com
jssiON
oN Gov'
PRocuREmENT, 1 REPORT OF THE COmission o.r
GovERNmENT Paocunw
21 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CommcnssioN REPORT].
22
See ComissIon REPoRT, supra note 21, at 20-21.
23 Both military and civilian federal procurement laws establish preferences for
competitive bidding (formal advertising). Federal statutes authorize negotiated
procurement only if formal advertising is "not feasible and practicable" and any
one of a list of conditions is satisfied. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1976 & Supp. III
1979) (military); 41 U.S.C. §§ 5, 252(c), 254 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (civilian).
See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 21, at 20.
24 Federal regulations also establish a preference for competitive bidding by
requiring the use of formal advertising where "feasible and practicable under the
existing conditions and circumstances." 32 C.F.R. § 2-102 (1979) (military); 41
C.F.R. § 1-1.301-2 (1980) (civilian).
2
5 CommissioN REP RT, supra note 21, at 20 & n.25; B. NAsH & J. Cininxc, I
FEDERAL PoCuEMENT LAw 317 (3d ed. 1977). See supra note 1.
26
As in the federal government, competitive bidding is the usual practice in
all the states. See Short, supra note 8, at 214; infra Appendi:x II; see also STATI
PuR HAsxNG, supra note 5, at 6.6.
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ing (an extremely conservative estimate in light of the federal
statistics), this amounts to $34 billion in 1980.27
This Comment examines competitive negotiation in state government procurement. It focuses on the Request for Proposals
(RFP), a document governments use to initiate the competitive
negotiation process. After considering appropriate standards for
the use of RFPs, this Comment discusses the need for protection
from the cronyism and favoritism common in the letting of noncompetitive contracts by inefficient state purchasing systems. 28
Finally, the Comment suggests statutory safeguards against capricious
or dishonest administrative action 29 and provisions that will enhance the effectiveness of judicial review of negotiated procurements.8 0
Part I of this Comment compares the salient features of competitive bidding and competitive negotiation, and considers ways
in which both of these processes can be structured to maximize
competition. Part II then discusses common problems in state
negotiated procurement, using cases to illustrate particular difficulties. Part III introduces the Model Procurement Code, summarizes its provisions, and criticizes the Code. Finally, part IV
presents and discusses the advantages of a proposed substitute for the
Code's provisions on competitive negotiation.
27

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
2 For examples of cases involving favoritism, collusion, and fraud in competitive bidding, see City of Oakland v. California Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 573, 104
P.2d 30 (1940); Edward D. Lord, Inc. v. Municipal Utilities Auth., 133 N.J. Super.
503, 337 A.2d 621 (1975); Jered Contracting Corp. v. New York City Transit
Auth., 22 N.Y.2d 187, 239 N.E.2d 197, 292 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1968). These problems
have also been the subject of scholarly comment, e.g., IA C. ANTmAu, MvNicni'A
CORPORATION LAw § 10.46 (1980); 10 E. McQumm, TBE LAw or Mtmcn'AL
CoRpoRATONS § 26.69 (3d rev. ed. 1981), and federal investigation, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 13, 1981, § 1, at 39, col. 1 ("67 Counties Linked to Oklahoma Kickbacks").
29 For an example of existing statutory safeguards against dishonest official
action, see 10 U.S.C. § 2304(h) (Supp. III 1979). That statute states that no
contract for transportation of government property may require cargo containers of
any particular size, preventing procurement officers from steering contracts to carriers with odd sized containers. See also STATE Puncmtsmc, supra note 5, at
10.1-.6.
30 For examples of provisions contributing to effective judicial review, see 10
U.S.C. §2304(b) (Supp. 1II 1979); 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.305(b) (1980).
The regulations require officials who choose negotiated procurement over formal advertising
to "set forth enough facts and circumstances to clearly and convincingly establish
that the use of formal advertising would not have been feasible or practicable."
41 C.F.R. § 1-3.305(b) (1980). This requirement, if strictly enforced, would provide a sufficiently detailed explanation for the choice of negotiation to permit courts
to exercise effective judicial review.
The statute requires the agency to keep data respecting the negotiation of each
purchase for six years, ensuring that courts will have an adequate record to review
any legal challenge to a procurement. Cf. State ex rel. E.D.S. Fed. Corp. v.
Ginsberg, 259 S.E.2d 618, 626 (W. Va. 1979) (it would be "enormously useful" if
agency filed written statement explaining contract award decision).
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I. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT

CONTRACTING METHODS:
THE NEED TO INSTITUTIONALIZE COMPETITION

Federal and state governments use both competitive bidding
and competitive negotiation to procure goods and services.$' The
two methods are predicated on different assumptions and address
different governmental needs. Each method is discussed generally
so as to highlight the importance of the differences between these
32
two procurement methods.
The description of competitive bidding is applicable to most
state procurement systems. 3 Because competitive negotiation originated in federal procurement practice 3 4 and has been adopted
by states only recently,33 the description of that process is drawn
from federal statutes and regulations.

SIP. SHNrrzut, supra note 18, at 20; J.WnELF. & R. PASLEY, supra note 18,
at 175. In addition to competitive bidding and negotiation, some commentators
identify "two-step formal advertising" as an alternative procurement method. See
40 Comp. Gen. 40 (1960); P. Smnrrm, supra note 18, at 193-200; Nash & Love,
supra note 18, at 322, 333-36; Short, supra note 8, at 214. See generallyMcClelland, Negotiated Procurement.and the Rule of Law: The Fiasco of Public
Law 87-653, 32 ForauH . L. REv. 411, 422-25 (1964).
Two-step formal advertising, a hybrid of competitive bidding and negotiation,
is largely a federal procurement method, and differs from competitive bidding only
in permitting the procurement officer some initial flexibility before selecting the
final bid solely on the basis of price. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 2-501 to -503.2 (1979); 41
C.F.R. §§ 1-2.501 to -2.503-2 (1980).
This method is, therefore, beyond the
scope of this Comment, which focuses on competitive negotiation in state
procurement.
This Comment refers to purchases involving only one offeror as noncompetitive
negotiated procurement. Such procurements are generally permitted when there
is only one possible supplier (sole source procurement), or for small purchases and
emergency procurement. See 32 C.F.R. § 3-210.2(i) (1979) (military sole source
procurement); 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.210(a) (1) (1980) (civilian sole source pi-curement); 32 C.F.R. § 3-203 (Supp. 1980) (military small purchases); 41 C.F.R.
§ 1-3.203 (1980) (civilian small purchases); 32 C.F.L §§ 3-201 to -202 (1979 &
Supp. 1980) (military emergency procurements); 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-3.201 to -3.202
(1980) (civilian emergency procurement). Most state laws authorize noncompetitive procurements for small purchases, see STATE PuRcHAsrIrN, supra note 5,
at A.1-.13 (Appendix A), and some allow them for emergency purchases, vom Baur
& Del Duca, supra note 20, at 321-22. Because of their relative infrequency, noncompetitive negotiated procurements are also beyond the scope of this Comment.
32
For comparisons of formal advertising and negotiated procurement, see W.
KYE , CovENmENT CONTBAcTS iN A NuTsHEr. 175 (1979); P. SHNIrZER, supra
note 18, at 20-22.
ss See infra Appendix IL
3
4For a discussion of the complexity of federal procurement practices, see
Commrs.soN REPORT, supra note 21, at 31-38.
35 See supra note 13. In 1978, Kentucky became the first state to enact legislation authorizing the use of RFPs in competive negotiation. Ky. REv. STAT.
§§ 45A.085-.090(2) (1980).
See Palo, Implementing the Model Procurement
Code: Kentucky-The First Test, 8 Pur. CoNT.Lj. 14 (1976).
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A. A Comparison of Competitive Bidding
and
Competitive Negotiation
Competitive bidding is the standard government contracting
s
method.3
Thirty-five states require formal advertising in a widely
circulated newspaper, initiating competitive bidding, for all purchases exceeding a specified dollar amount.3 7 This enhances competition for a particular purchase 38 and apprises the public of government purchasing activities.3 9
The document used to solicit bids is called an Invitation for
Bids (IFB).40 The IFB contains the terms, conditions, and specifications of the purchase, 41 describing in detail what the government
seeks to procure. Whether the government needs goods or services,
"[t]he unique feature of the .. formal advertising technique is its
insistence on offers of products or services which are essentially
identical, regardless of which competitor is selected." 42 Detailed
specifications help ensure that competitors are placed on an equal
footing,43 and, with all other factors standardized by the specifications, price becomes the determinative factor in the contract award. 44
Bidders make their bids based upon the specifications listed in
the IFB, without any discussions with government procurement
officers. The bidder submits a sealed bid that cannot be changed
or withdrawn. The bids are opened publicly at a time and place
36Every state has a statutory preference for government contracting by competitive bidding. See supra note 26. Federal statutes and regulations also reflect
this preference. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
87 STATE PtmcHAsiN,
supra note 5, at 6.4.
38
But see id. ("In lieu of these requirements, a listing or an abbreviated type
of public notice .. . is more reasonable").
39

d.

4

aThe RFP is simply the initial solicitation of proposals from potential suppliers, and its issuance contemplates a procurement process involving negotiation
with offerors. By contrast, the IFB is used to solicit firm and binding bids. Thus,
this is not simply a difference in nomenclature. See J. WrmLAN & R. PAsrY,
supra note 18, at 6; infra text accompanying notes 49-60. The decision to use an
RFP represents a procurement officer's determination that the contract will be let
by competitive negotiation instead of by competitive bidding. The failure to maintain this distinction between the initiating documents results in unnecessary confusion, and in litigation. See infra text following note 106.
41 STATE PuRcHAsmG, supra note 5, at 6.5. For a detailed description of what
an IFB should contain, see 32 C.F.R. §§ 2-200 to -201 (Supp. 1980).
42
ComnmssoN REPoRT, supra note 21, at 19 (emphasis in original).
43

Sweezey v. Mayor of Malden, 273 Mass. 536, 542, 174 N.E. 269, 271
supra note 5, at 11.2.
See COMMNSSION REPORT, supra note 21, at 18.

See

<1931);
44
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designated- in -the IFB. 45 Provided the bidder is responsible 46 and
responsive, 47 the contract is awarded to the bidder submitting the
48
lowest price.
Competitive negotiation is an entirely different contracting
process. The government solicits proposals, 49 not bids, with a Request for Proposals. An RFP often contains only tentative assessments of what the government seeks to procure, rather than the
definite and detailed specifications found in an IFB.5 0 In many
instances, RFPs are used to initiate procurement of items for which
adequate specifications are unavailable, 1 such as research and development 52 or sophisticated technology. 53 Consequently, a procurement officer gains considerable flexibility by choosing competitive negotiation with an open-ended RFP, rather than competitive
bidding with a carefully specified IFB.
415Nash
46

& Love, supra note 18, at 312. See supra note 32.
"Responsibility" is defined as "the ability of a bidder or proposer for a
government contract to satisfy the standards of a public procuring body, conditions
which include: (1) adequate financial resources; (2) ability to comply with technical performance and delivery schedules; (3) satisfactory record of performance;
(4) satisfactory record of integrity." W. KzEYs, supra note 32, at 92. See
Gray, Responsiveness Versus Responsibility: Policy and Practice in Government
Contracts, 7 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 46 (1974); Nash, Survey of State and Local Government Contracts Law, 47 GEo. WsH. L. REv. 1085, 1102-33 (1979).
47
"Responsiveness" is defined as compliance with all material terms of an
IFB. The federal regulations state that responsiveness to the timeliness of submission is necessary if "all bidders [are to] stand on an equal footing and the
integrity of the formal advertising system [is to] be maintained." 32 C.F.R.
§2-301(a) (1979); 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.301(a) (1980); see also Nash & Love, supra
note 18, at 312 n.8. See generally Nash, supra note 46, at 1087-1101.
The federal regulations for negotiated procurement contain no concept comparable to responsiveness. 32 C.F.R. §§ 3-100 to -1300.7 (1979 & Supp. 1980); 41
C.F.R. §§ 1-3.000 to .1220-14 (1980). Because specifications in many RFPs are
skeletal or vague, the concept of responsiveness is generally inapplicable to
negotiated procurement.
4
8NAs H & Cminic, supra note 25, at 224; Nash & Love, supra note 18, at
312. For an exhaustive analysis of federal procedures for competitive bid opening
and mistakes, see P. Smnrrzn, supra note 18, at 381-401, 449-483. For an overview
of competitive bidding by state governments, see STATE PURCHASMG, supra note
5, at 2.1-.16.
49 Nash & Love, supra note 18, at 325 n.34.
50
See W. KEYES, supra note 32, at 175.
5
1 Federal regulations authorize the use of RFPs when specifications are inadequate. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 3-210.1, -210.2(xiii) (1979); 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.210
(a) (13) (1980). After negotiation, as the government nears the conclusion of the
procurement process, the RFPs naturally become more specific. See C. DANnoF1
GovERNulxmTT CONTRACTING AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 260 (1968).
5
2 See C. DA oF, supra note 51, at 177, 238. Federal regulations authorize
negotiated procurement of research and development. 32 C.F.R. § 3-211 (1979);
41 C.F.R. § 1-3.211 (1980).
53
For example, this Comment examines cases involving computerized lottery
systems, data processing equipment, and a telecommunications system. See infra
text following note 105.
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Procurement officials use RFPs when they are uncertain about
what is available in the market or what can be produced. Discussions 54 with proposers are thus essential to ascertain more specifically what the government needs and whether it can be obtained
in the market. After proposers reply to RFPs, for example, negotiations with each may begin, possibly leading to modifications of
the RFP and amendments to proposals. Competitive negotiation,
therefore, provides the officer with considerable latitude to clarify
ambiguities, fill omissions, and correct defects in the original
specifications. 55
Competitively negotiated contracts are awarded on the basis of
price and other evaluative criteria,5 6 provided the latter are stated
in the RFP. 57 Evaluative criteria may include quality standards58
performance standards, 50 or "life-cycle costing." 60 Thus, the contract is awarded to the offeror who submits the best overall proposal
in terms of both quality and pricee1
In sum, competitive bidding is a rigid, uniform contracting
method initiated by a specific solicitation in the form of an IFB.6 2
In contrast, competitive negotiation is a flexible approach initiated
by a general, perhaps unspecified, solicitation in the form of an
RFP. Decisions in the former case are based on price alone; in the
latter case, price is only one factor in choosing the best overall
proposal.
54 "Negotiation" and "discussion" are often used synonymously.

Comp. Gen. 102, 111 (1971).

See, e.g., 51

55 This flexibility is limited by prohibiting government disclosure of information
in a proposal to a competing offeror if that information would give the competitor
an advantage in the negotiations. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. §§ 3-805.3(b) to -805.3(c)
(1979);
41 C.F.R. § 1-3.805-1(b) (1980).
56
CommssSioN REPORT, supra note 21, at 19 ("The single element which most
acutely distinguishes negotiation techniques from formal advertising is the subjective judgment which weighs quality and other factors against price").
57
STATE PURCHASNc, supra note 5, at 6.7. In federal procurement, the RFP
must list the evaluation factors to be used. 32 C.F.R. § 3-501(M) (Supp. 1980);
41 C.F.R. § 1-3.802(c) (1980).
58Federal regulations authorize consideration of quality in civilian procurement.
See 41 C.F.R. § 3-101(6) (iii) (1980). The Model Procurement Code mentions
price and quality "tradeoffs" in § 3-203 commentary (3) (a).
59 Nash & Love, supra note 18, at 325 n.35.
60 "Life cycle costing" is an accounting analysis used to determine the total
cost of owning, operating, and maintaining a procured item with a measurable
service life. Nash & Love, supra note 18, at 409 n.267 & 410. These costs are
considered in addition to the acquisition price. STATE PRcHASING, supra note 5,
at 11.8; Nash & Love, supra note 18, at 409-10, 428. See infra text accompanying
notes 156-57.
61 Nash & Love, supra note 18, at 324. See generally State ex rel. E.D.S. Fed.
Corp. v. Ginsberg, 259 S.E.2d 618, 624 (W. Va. 1979).
62 Some government defense contract analysts argue that, because of the restrictive nature of competitive bidding, a disproportionate amount of contracts is
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B. The Need for Maximum Effective Competition
It is a postulate of economics that competition minimizes the
cost of goods to consumers. 3 Competition also tends to improve the
quality of goods purchased, to encourage innovation among suppliers, and to increase the buyer's choice. 64 Competitive bidding
assures competition by definition because it typically results in the
lowest price to the purchaser. By tying negotiation to a competitive
framework, the chance of obtaining quality, sophisticated goods at
the lowest possible cost are clearly enhanced. Besides increasing
economic efficiency in procurement, competition reduces favoritism
and inspires confidence in the public procurement system. 5 As a
result, "it is essential that all acquisitions be made under conditions
which foster competition among a sufficient number of potential
vendors." 66
Competition, however, exists in different degrees in the marketplace, and varies widely among different products and services6 7
For some goods and services, the market consists of similar or identical items that consumers choose on the basis of lowest price. For
other items, there is either no clearly defined market, or quality
differences are great but tend to be equalized by price variations.,B
Competitive bidding is the appropriate method where items are
similar,6 9 because the desired items can be specified in detail. Competitive negotiation should be used when quality differences exist, 0
because it gives procurement officers the opportunity to clarify available specifications and to consider quality in comparing prices.
Just as lack of competition may result in inefficient government
procurement, too much competition may also create inefficiency in
the negotiated procurement process. This observation raises the
concern that states adopting competitive negotiation may also adopt
the federal statutory requirement that "the maximum number of
let by the more flexible method of competitive negotiation. Morris, Some Facts of
Life About Competition in Defense Procurement, 4 DEF. MGMT. J. 9 (1968),
reprinted in J. WELAN & B. PAsLEY, supra note 18, at 316-18; see D. PACE,
NEcomrroN AND MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTS 84 (1970).
03 P. SAumunsox, EcoNoMucs 544 (10th ed. 1976).
64
See STATE P RcHASiNG, supra note 5, at 6.2.
65 Id.; accord W. KEYES, supra note 32, at 109.
06 STATE PurCHAsiNG, supra note 5, at 6.2 (emphasis omitted).
Cf. ComMIssioN REPORT, supra note 21, at 22 (recommending the use of competitive procurement procedures).
6T
See CovnmsisroN REPORT, supra note 21, at 19.
6
See Nash & Love, supra note 18, at 338.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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qualified sources" be solicited in a negotiated procurement. 7 ' But
"[p]articipation by a 'maximum' number of firms ... may unduly
complicate the selection process and add considerably to both the
procuring agency's and the offerors' costs." 72 In certain types of
procurement, notably for research and development, the total cost
of preparing and responding to RFPs may exceed the value of the
contract.7 8 Furthermore, soliciting the maximum number of potential offerors may result in diminishing the quality of the procured
item.7 4 The goal of getting the best quality goods for the lowest
price may therefore be subverted by a legal mandate to maximize
competition.
Nash and Love suggest "maximum effective competition" 75 as
a solution to this conflict between achieving economy and maximizing competition. They define maximum effective competition as
tailoring both an agency's needs and the procurement process "to
take advantage of the existing competition and to procure most
economically a product that effectively satisfies its needs." 76 That
is, an agency should maximize competition only to the extent that it
is effective to procure what it needs. This, however, is a vague con77
cept that must be clarified.
One important step toward achieving maximum effective competition is to perform a market analysis.78 Such an analysis seeks
to determine whether the particular item the agency needs can be
procured on the open market, or whether it will require a contract
for design or development.79 A thorough analysis should examine
and reveal several characteristics of a market for a particular good
10 U.S.C. §2304(g) (1976).
CoMiuSsION REPoRT, supra note 21, at 23. As a result of this argument,
the Commission recommended "[a]djust[ing] the statutory provision on solicitations
and discussions in competitive procurements other than formal advertising in the
following manner: . . . (b) Provide for soliciting a competitive rather than a
'maximum' number of sources, for the public announcement of procurements, and
for honoring the reasonable requests of other sources to compete." Id. 22.
73
See Nash & Love, supra note 18, at 338 n.61. Cf. CommissioN RPoar,
supra note 21, at 23 ("Under [certain] circumstances, total solicitation costs may
exceed the value of the contract").
74
See Nash & Love, supra note 18, at 338 n.61.
75 Id. No state procurement law codifies this standard. See infra Appendix II.
The Chiles bill, introduced in the 94th Congress, would have made maximum
effective competition an explicit federal procurement policy. See S. 3005, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. §2(b)(5), reprinted in 122 CONG. REc. 3762 (1976).
76
Nash & Love, supra note 18, at 338 n.61.
77 This Comment expands the concept of maximum effective competition beyond
the particular problem Nash and Love were discussing. See infra text following
note 130.
18 Nash and Love, supra note 18, at 337-38.
7
9See id. 337.
71
72

1981]
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or service. These include the number of potential offerors; whether
the item to be procured varies in quality; whether the item's price
varies greatly; how difficult it will be to specify what the agency
wants; the expense involved in preparing an RFP and implementing
competitive negotiation, and how costly it will be to respond to an
RFP.8 0
Because relatively few states even authorize the use of competi82
tive negotiation,81 state agencies do not perform market analyses.
Thus, the chances of obtaining maximum effective competition are
slim. Yet, procurement agency attempts to attain maximum effective competition, such as undertaking a market analysis, would link
government procurement to particular market conditions.8 3 This
linkage represents a substantial improvement over present statutes
that either ignore economic realities by permitting only competitive bidding,8 4 or contain standards, like "feasible-practicable," that
can be easily abused.ss
The major obstacle to implementing state procurement systems
based upon maximum effective competition is that states which
accept the argument that competitive negotiation is desirable may
adopt the federal standard for determining when competitive negotiation is to be used. Federal law requires competitive bidding "in
all cases in which the use of such [a] method is feasible and practicable under the existing conditions and circumstances." 86 Otherwise, competitive negotiation may be used.8 7 Obviously, the federal
80 A market analysis will not prevent corruption or favoritism, and will not
ensure that officials will efficiently and honestly implement the appropriate procurement method. Requiring a written market analysis, however, will provide a reviewing court with the means to determine whether the procurement process up to
that point has been characterized by arbitrariness. Given the present inadequacy
of most state procurement laws, see supra notes 7 & 35 and accompanying text;
infra Appendix 11, a decision to employ competitive negotiation probably results in
a waste of money, see supra text accompanying notes 71-74, and an increased
possibility of litigation over the procurement. Thus, the importance of the procurement method chosen indicates that encouraging a careful choice of methods by
requiring a market analysis is highly desirable.
81
See supratext accompanying note 35 and infra Appendix II.
82 There is no need to conduct a market analysis if the government can procure
only through competitive bidding. Yet even the states that now authorize competitive negotiation do not require their agencies to conduct market analyses. See
infra Appendix 1H.
83 The product or service that the agency seeks to procure defines the market,
the market defines the procurement method, and the method determines whether
the specifications will be broad (RFP) or narrow (IFB). A market analysis provides the crucial link between the first and second parts of this sequence.
8
4 See infra text accompanying note 94.
8
5 See infranote 88 and text accompanying notes 88 & 89.
86 10 U.S.C. §2304(a) (1976); 41 U.S.C. § 25 2(c)(10) (1976).
5
87 10 U.S.C. §2304(a) (1976); 41 U.S.C. §2 2(c)(10) (1976).

190

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 130:179

"feasible-practicable" standard is quite vague,"" and it has gutted
the statutory preference for competitive bidding.8 9 The standard
offers procurement officials much discretion, and the public and
competing offerors have little protection from either intentional or
unintentional abuse of that discretion. 0 Although it has been
argued here that the states should use competitive negotiation more
frequently, 91 a shift from competitive bidding to competitive negotiation will be productive only if,92 unlike federal procurement,93
the conditions for using each method are clearly established by
statute.
In sum, state procurement is currently characterized by distorting the meaning of competitive bidding to cover items for which
competitive negotiation would work more efficiently. 94 And in those
states in which competitive negotiation is now statutorily authorized,
the safeguards and provisions that would go far toward obtaining
maximum effective competition are not in force.9 5
II.

INADEQUATE STATUTES AND THE MISUSE OF REQUESTS FOR
PROPOSALS CREATE JUDICIAL CONFUSION

Because most state laws authorize only competitive bidding96
some state agencies try to adapt competitive bidding procedures to
complex procurements. 9 7 Yet, in many such cases, maximizing the
s8 Neither the amendment promulgating this standard nor its legislative history
reveals the meaning of "existing conditions and circumstances." Thus, it is easy to
argue in any given procurement that competitive bidding would not be "feasible
and practicable." Also, neither the amendment nor its legislative history specifies
who makes the detennination of feasibility and practicability. McClelland, supra
note 31, at 417.
89 See supranotes 23-25 and accompanying text.
90 See McClelland, supra note 31, at 416-21.
91 See supratext accompanying note 70 and following notes 27 & 64.
92 There are two problems with shifting too far toward competitive negotiation.
First, all states adopting some form of competitive negotiation have based their
legislation on the Model Procurement Code, see supra note 12 and accompanying
text, which does not result in a particularly efficient form of competitive negotiation.
See infra notes 174-89 and accompanying text. Second, overuse of competitive
negotiation tends to nullify the statutory preferences for competitive bidding, see
supra note 26, which, when properly used, is the most efficient form of procurement.
See supra text accompanying notes 63-64 and text following note 64.
93 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
94 Cf. STATE PuRcHAswc, supra note 5, at 6.6 ("Nonetheless, most state . . .
purchasing laws do not provide for the use of competitive negotiation in those cases
where the formal sealed competitive bid process is not effective.").
95 See infra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
96 See infraAppendix IL
97

In particular, officials issue RFPs, or RFPs that are really IFBs, in competitively bid procurements. See, e.g., Transportation Displays, Inc. v. City of
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number of potential competitors may not be economical. 8 Maximum effective competition requires removing impediments to effective competitive negotiation. The three basic impediments are
collusive drafting of specifications to preclude competitive bidding, 9
failure to disclose evaluation factors and their weights to all proposers, 100 and subjective evaluation of proposals. 0 1
Among the reasons for these problems is agency failure to
clearly distinguish between competitive bidding and competitive
negotiation, resulting in courts lacking the proper analytical framework for examining challenges to specific procurements.0 2 The
first two problems are largely caused by inadequate statutes and
regulations, 10 3 and the third by poor implementation of existing
statutes and regulations. 1°4 Thus, while these problems can be
largely mitigated by the substitute legislation proposed in this Comment, the performance of state officials must be carefully monitored
to insure that the statute's purpose is being carried out.
This part focuses on these problems by examining the need to
identify clearly the chosen method of procurement, the determination when an RFP is to be used, and the selection of appropriate
specifications and evaluation factors to be listed in the RFP. The
discussion of the problems with the incorrect use of RFPs will
focus on the facts of American Totalisator Co. v. Seligman 0 5 and
other appropriate cases. American Totalisator's facts are set forth
at some length in order to allow consideration of what procurement
New Orleans, 346 So. 2d 359, 361 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (EFP used in competitive
bidding).
98
See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
9 The need for objective measurable criteria in competitive bidding is analyzed
in Crowell & Chierichella, Source Selection Under the Model Procurement Code,
NAT'. CoNT. MGMT. Q.J., Third Quarter, 1978, at 17-20. See infra notes 162-65
and accompanying text.
100 See Femnino & Smail, Disclosure of Evaluation Factors and Their Relative
Weights: A Continuing Procurement Problem, NAT'L CONT. MGmT. J., Winter
1977-78, at 15.
101 See STATE PRmcaAsiN,, supranote 5, at 6.6-.7.
10 2 See infra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
03
1
See supra text accompanying note 95.
04
1 See supra text accompanying note 28. It should be noted that there are no
cases dealing with recently enacted laws, patterned after the Model Procurement
Code, authorizing competitive negotiation. See infra Appendix II. Whether these
new statutes will spawn litigation is discussed at infra notes 166-89 and accompanying text.
10534 Pa. Commw. Ct. 391, 384 A.2d 242 (1977) (decree nisi issued), exceptions dismissed per curiam, 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 436, 384 A.2d 266 (1978) (en
bane), aff'd, 489 Pa. 568, 414 A.2d 1037 (1980); see also 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 639,
367 A.2d 756 (1976) (preliminary objections overruled).
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method the state used, whether the state could have used competitive
bidding properly, what problems a market analysis would have alleviated or eliminated, and whether maximum effective competition.
was attained.
A. American Totalisator Co. v. Seligman
American Totalisator involved a challenge to the letting of a
public contract for a computerized state lottery system. The Pennsylvania Bureau of State Lotteries invited companies to bid for a
contract to develop and implement a daily numbers game. Only
two companies, American Totalisator (AmTote) and Control Data
Corporation (CDC), submitted bids. After an initial administrative study of the state's needs, an Evaluation Committee was formed.
It prepared an RFP, large parts of which were borrowed from an
RFP prepared by the state of Maryland for a similar lottery procurement.
The RFP said that the contract would be awarded pursuant to
state laws relating to the award of public contracts, and "'in conformity with the concept of the lowest responsible bidder.' "101
The cover letter sent with the RFP said that Pennsylvania invited
companies to participate in a "'competitive bidding proposal,'" 107
and that bidders would be held to the terms submitted in their
proposals.
Both company's proposals met all of the RFP's technical requirements. As the RFP noted, the Committee, using eight categories, reviewed the bidders' technical proposals before the cost
proposals were opened and considered. The proposals differed
significantly only in that the Committee preferred CDC's computer
terminal because it had a cathode ray tube that facilitated clear and
efficient operation.
The RFP, possibly anticipating this exact situation, stated that
innovative suggestions were encouraged but that "'[n]o bid will be
disqualified or rejected for failure to submit such suggestions,' "1108
and that if the Committee liked one proposer's idea, "'all bidders
[would] have an opportunity to conforni their proposals in accordance with the revised provisions.' "109
AmTote, however, was
never given an opportunity to conform its proposal to CDC's sug106 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 396, 384 A.2d at 245.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 399, 384 A.2d at 246.
'o Id.
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gestion, although the court found that AmTote could have provided
a comparable cathode ray tube."10
After the Committee finished the technical evaluation, Seligman,
the acting Secretary of Revenue, publicly opened the cost proposals.
Each bidder thus learned of the other's cost proposal, and it became
obvious that "CDC and AmTote had not calculated their bids on
the same basis." "1 CDC used an unorthodox method to compute
the cost of its proposal, knowing that the state would be unable to
ascertain the cost of operating the game. It submitted its proposal
in that format so that the state would have to ask for clarification
after the bids were opened.
In fact, Seligman did write to each company requesting clarification of its cost proposal. Prior to Seligman's letter, AmTote's
bid was definitely lower.
But after CDC changed its figures to
comport with AmTote's method of calculation, CDC's bid became
lower. AmTote was neither told that CDC had computed its cost
proposal differently nor given a chance to rebid its cost proposal in
light of the change in CDC's bid.
The Committee finally concluded that CDC's bid was lower.
For that reason, and because it preferred CDC's terminal with the
cathode ray tube, it recommended giving CDC the contract.
Seligman relied on the Committee's recommendations in awarding
2
the contract to CDC."

B. The Need to Identify the ProcurementMethod Clearly
Part I of this Comment emphasized the differences between
competitive negotiation and competitive bidding. A document
with detailed specifications-an IFB-is used to initiate competitive
bidding, whereas one with more general specifications-an RFPbegins competitive negotiation." 3 If competitive bidding is used,
110 Id. at 398, 384 A.2d at 246.
"

Id. at 404, 384 A.2d at 248.

112 Id. at 417, 384 A.2d at 256. AmTote brought an action against the Cornmonwealth to enjoin the contract award and CDC intervened. The commonwealth court found that the Commonwealth breached the terms of its own RFP
by not awarding the contract to AmTote, the lowest responsible bidder prior to the
"clarification" of proposals. Id. at 435, 384 A.2d at 265. The court issued a
decree nisi voiding the contract with CDC and ordered the Lottery Bureau to
resolicit proposals and competitively bid the contract. Id. at 436, 384 A.2d at 265.
CDC won the contract following the *rebidding. 489 Pa. at 574, 414 A.2d at
1040. AmTote's subsequent appeal was unsuccessful, as the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed the commonwealth court's finding that the RFP initiated competitive bidding. See id. at 575, 414 A.2d at 1040.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 41 & 49-50 and text following note 41.
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there can be no discussions between the procuring agency and any
offeror." 4 Each method, then, has its own procedures, ideally
formulated so that the use of either will secure maximum effective
competition. 116
In American Totalisator, however, the state gave conflicting
signals about what method it was using. Some facts indicated the
use of competitive bidding-for example, the RFP's statement that
the contract would be awarded "'in conformity with the concept of
1 17
the lowest responsible bidder,' "116 and the public opening of bids.
Other facts pointed toward competitive negotiation-for instance,
the use of an RFP rather than an IFB, the discussions with the
bidders seeking to clarify the meaning of their bids,"" and the
provisions giving bidders an opportunity to conform their proposals
to other bidders' suggestions.1 1 9 Finally, there were indications
that the state itself was confused, such as the invitation to participate
in a "competitive bidding proposal," and the encouragement to
submit innovative suggestions with the proviso that no bids would
be rejected for failure to do so.120
As a result of these conflicting signals, AmTote thought that it
was involved in competitive bidding,121 while CDC assumed that the
agency was using competitive negotiation.122 The state increased
the confusion by negotiating with CDC, yet not permitting AmTote
to change its bid.128 This occurred despite the stipulation in the
124
RFP that all bidders would be held to the terms of their proposals.
Thus, American Totalisator illustrates the confusion resulting from purchasing officials' failure to clearly identify the chosen
procurement method. It is a serious mistake to initiate competitive bidding with an RPF,u5 because an RFP indicates to
potential contractors that negotiation will be a key phase of the
114

See supra text following note 44.
115 See supra text accompanying and following note 75.
11634 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 396, 384 A.2d at 245.
117 Id. at 401, 384 A.2d at 247.
118 Id. at 406-11, 384 A.2d at 250-53.
L19 Id.at 398, 384 A.2d at 246.
120 Id. at 399, 384 A.2d at 246.
121 See id. at 419, 384 A.2d at 258.
122 489 Pa. at 575 n.5, 414 A.2d at 1040 n.5.
128 See infra notes 133 & 144 and accompanying text. This problem may be
attributed in large part to the state's archaic procurement law. See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit.
71, §§ 187, 1611-1619 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1980).
12434 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 396, 384 A.2d at 245.
125 This is particularly the case when the RFP was previously used to conduct
a negotiated procurement. See id. at 432, 384 A.2d at 264 (use of the Maryland

1FF "unwise").
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procurement process and that the contract will not be awarded
solely on the basis of the lowest price. Initiating competitive bidding with an RFP may mislead bidders into believing that they must
submit proposals 128 that cost more and take longer to prepare than
bids. Yet preparing proposals is wasted effort if the only relevant
item is cost.127 By clearly identifying beforehand which procurement
method it is using, the agency avoids imposing needless expense on
parties as well as ultimately defending its position in court.
C. The Advantages of Competitive Negotiation
Some state laws explicitly permit negotiated procurement; 128
in other states, courts have interpreted state statutes to permit negotiation 129 or to allow the state to award a contract to an offeror
other than the lowest bidder. 30 It is important to note, though,
that these procedures are inferior to competitive negotiation. The
negotiation permitted by these statutes can result in competition
among proposers being cut off prematurely, whereas competitive
negotiation attempts to maintain competition throughout the procurement process.
1. Expanding the Concept of Maximum Effective Competition
In American Totalisator, the state allowed one offeror, CDC,
to revise its bid after making each bidder's cost proposals public.' 8 '
Yet, despite the RFP's representation, 132 the state did not give
AmTote the opportunity to conform its proposal to CDC's by in12 6

See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
127 An RF1 invites the submission of information that will be the basis for
later negotiations. But if negotiations are not intended, then preparing the proposals is a waste of the offerors' time and money.
128 See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling Auth., 84
Wis. 2d 462, 471, 267 N.W.2d 659, 663 (1978).
129 See, e.g., Equitable Shipyards, Inc. v. State, 93 Wash. 2d 465, 473, 611
P.2d 396, 401 (1980). In states where the legal status of a negotiated procurement
is in doubt, it is prudent for the procuring agency to seek sole source procurement
authorization, see supra note 31, from the state attorney general prior to negotiating
the contract. See, e.g., 1969 Op. Pa. Atty. Gen. No. 285 (authorizing the Commonwealth to negotiate a sole source contract with Westinghouse for specialized
equipment needed to operate a water purification plant). This practice, however,
completely eliminates competition from the procurement process.
130 See, e.g., State ex rel. E.D.S. Fed. Corp. v. Ginsberg, 259 S.E.2d 618, 625
(W. Va. 1979).
181 See 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 406, 409, 384 A.2d at 250, 253.
182 Id. at 399, 432-33, 384 A.2d at 246, 264.
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cluding a -cathode tube. This meant that AmTote and CDC were
bidding on different specifications, so that AmTote was unable to
compete effectively against CDC., Nor was AmTote permitted to
rebid its cost proposal when, following clarification, CDC was
1 33
allowed to change its bid.

These aspects of the case make it clear that the definition of
maximum effective competition .34 must be expanded to include a
requirement that procuring agencies should never take any action
which will, directly or indirectly, prematurely limit effective competition. By permitting AmTote to conform its proposal to GDC's
performance specifications and then to rebid its cost proposal, Pennsylvania could have had effective competition until the actual contract award. Denying AmTote these opportunities effectively ended
competition.
In another case, Waste Management, Inc. v. Wisconsin Solid
Waste Recycling Authority 3 5 the state used an RFP in letting a
twenty-year contract for the design, construction, and operation of
a solid waste recycling facility. 13 6 The RFP stated that after the
evaluation of proposals, the state would determine a priority list of
finalists and commence sequential negotiations with the first preferred proposer. If the state did not reach an agreement with that
proposer, it could then begin negotiations with the second preferred
.133Id. at

411, 384

A.2d at 253.

13 4 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
'35

84 Wis. 2d 462, 267 N.W.2d 659 (1978).

136 Contracts with architects and engineers are generally considered "professional services," and are exempted by many statutes from competitive bidding. See,
e.g., Autotote Ltd. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 85 N.J. 363, 371, 427
A.2d 55, 59 (1981) (contract "constituted 'professional services' within the statutory
exception to the requirement of public bidding, N.J.S.A. 5:10-21"); see also W.
KEvs, supra note 32, at 167 ("Under the federal system Architect-Engineer services
fall generally under the category of professional and personal services which are to
be procured by negotiated procurement").
Federal statutes and regulations provide for an exception to competitive bidding
when procuring the services of architects and engineers. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 4540,
7212, 9540 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (Army, Navy, Air Force respectively); 40
U.S.C. §§ 541-544 (1976) (civilian agencies); 40 U.S.C. § 609 (1976) (General
Services Administration); 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-4.1000 to -4.1007 (1980) (civilian); 32
C.F.R. §§ 18-401 to -405 (1979) (military). States provide for a similar exception.
See Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 733, 739-42, 746-48 (1967); Slawsky & DeMarco, Is the
Price Right? State and Local Government Architect and Engineer Selection, 40
PUB. ADm. 1Ev. 269-74 (1980).
The Model Procurement Code explicitly addresses architect-engineer contracting. See MODEL PROCUEMENT CODE, supra note 12, §§ 5-101 to -501. For
an analysis of the Code's treatment of architect-engineer contracting, as well as of
state statutes, see Slawsky, The Architect-Engineer Selection Process: To Bid or Not
To Bid, 11 PUB. CONT. L.J. 232, 242-49, 255-57 (1979).
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proposer, continuing this process until it reached an agreement with
137
someone on the list.

This procedure also ends competition prematurely. During
simultaneous negotiations, the offeror is both negotiating with procurement officials and competing against other offerors who are
negotiating with the agency. On the other hand, during sequential
negotiations, the offeror's position is more secure. As long as its
representatives can come to terms with the state, it will obtain the
contract. Lower ranked proposals are considered only if negotia13 8
tions with higher ranked proposers fail.

If competitive negotiation is selected as the procurement
method, then a market analysis will enhance the competitive factors
in that process. A market analysis in American Totalisator might
have determined the number of potential offerors prior to issuing an
RFP; revealed the existence of certain innovations that could have
been specified in the original RFP; ascertained the price range for
the desired computer lottery system, and increased the detail and
precision of specifications in the original RFP. Pennsylvania procurement officials knew that Maryland had earlier procured a similar
lottery system and presumably could have obtained some of this
information from its state officials. 3 9
Maximizing effective competition, then, does not mean always
choosing competitive negotiation. It requires the agency to assess
the nature of the market for a good or service, determine how firms
,compete within that market, and tailor the procurement method to
take advantage of whatever competition exists for the particular
contract.
137 84 Wis. 2d at 479-80, 267 N.W.2d at 668.
138 The sequential negotiation technique employed in Waste Mgmt. prevents an
agency from choosing a lower ranked proposer who can conform to a higher ranked
-proposer's innovation at a lower cost. This technique, then, prevents efficient procurement in the sense of minimizing costs.
In State ex rel. E.D.S. Fed. Corp. v. Ginsberg, 259 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1979),
a winning proposer included in its proposal a provision violating one of the EFP's
requirements. The court dismissed the plaintiff's unresponsiveness argument by
noting that this provision was deleted during negotiations. Id. 621, 623. So besides
giving proposers the opportunity to conform to other proposals, negotiation allows
proposers to conform their proposals to the RFP.
In American Totalisator, CDC was arguably unresponsive to the RFP because
it purposefully calculated its cost figures so as to force the state to seek clarification.
Competitive negotiations would have prevented CDC from gaining an advantage
from its action by permitting AmTote to conform and rebid its proposal. See
infra text accompanying notes 143-44 and text following note 144.
139 34 Pa. Conmw. Ct. at 396, 432, 384 A.2d at 245, 264. By drawing on the
market analysis and contacting the Maryland agency, Pennsylvania officials could
have drafted detailed specifications, issued an IFB, and competitively bid the
-contract.
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2. Competitive Negotiation Includes Necessary
Safeguards and Guidelines
When state statutes authorize "negotiation" or courts construe
statutes to permit it, procurements become difficult because those
statutes rarely contain guidelines and safeguards to ensure the integrity of the procurement process. In Federal Electric Corp. v.
Fasi,140 the Hawaii Supreme Court recognized the need for such
safeguards, noting that the city of Honolulu could use an alternative
procedure to open bidding "so long as [the] agency has promulgated
rules and regulations to insure fair and open competition among
bidders." 1- The court held that "[t]he fact that the procedure was
susceptible to abuse and manipulation rendered it illegal." 142
Another problem that has led to litigation is agency failure to
stipulate exactly how it will regulate the final stages of the award
process. In Waste Management, the state agency wavered between
ordering simultaneous negotation with two finalists and negotiating
with the company whose proposal the evaluation committee rated
highest. 143 A regulation requiring simultaneous negotiation, or one
allowing negotiation with one company only after a certain stage in
the award process, would have cured this problem.
Regulations could also have eliminated the problem in American Totalisator,in which the process became unfair when the state
permitted one company to rebid its cost proposal after the bids were
opened publicly without permitting the other company to do likewise.1 " Either the bids should not have been publicly disclosed
and the procuring agency should have entered into negotiations with
both proposers, or no rebidding should have been permitted.
In State ex rel. E.D.S. Federal Corp. v. Ginsberg,145 it was
argued that the state had permitted one of the proposers to remove,
during negotiations, a provision in its proposal that violated an
14056 Hawaii 57, 527 P.2d 1284 (1974). The city of Honolulu attempted to
procure a sophisticated police communications system using what the Hawaii
Supreme Court called the "'request for proposal' method." Id. at 59, 527 P.2d
at 1287. This was the first time the city had used an RFP, and no regulations
governed such a procurement. The procurement was similar to the two-step formal
advertising method, see supra note 31, but the court ruled that the city had prevented offerors from competing fairly by combining the two steps. Id. at 60, 62,
527 P.2d at 1288.
141 Id. at 61,527 P.2d at 1288.
142 Id. at 62, 527 P.2d at 1289 (citations omitted).
143 84 Wis. 2d at 481-86,267 N.W.2d at 669-71.
14434 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 409-11, 384 A.2d at 251-53.
145 259 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1979).
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RFP requirement. 46 Although the court held that the state's action
was legal, 47 a regulation either requiring absolute responsiveness 48
or allowing unresponsive proposals to be "cured" during negotiation
would have avoided this lawsuit.
These cases make apparent the recurring judicial and administrative confusion resulting from attempts to purchase unusual goods
using antiquated competitive bidding statutes. Yet most of that
confusion would have been avoided had the agency, using its statutory authority, promulgated regulations prior to any procurement.
In the absence of such regulations, state negotiated procurements
14
are rarely competitive and all too often unfair.
D. Specifications and Evaluation Factors
1. Specifications: Detailed or Indefinite?
If specifications in an RFP are too detailed, a potential proposer
may argue that the procurement agency drafted the specifications
so narrowly that only one company could submit a proposal. In
BusTop Shelters, Inc. v. City of New York, 50 the plaintiff had been
the city's sole franchisee for bus stop shelter construction. The city
decided to award a long term contract, and issued an RFP with a
security requirement for applicants signficantly higher than that
originally demanded from the plaintiff. BusTop alleged that this
increased security deposit" 'resulted from a desire on the part of the
Comptroller's Office to construct a sweetheart contract for a competitor company of BusTop which the Comptroller knew could easily
meet such enormously inflated security demands.' "151 The court
held that the city was simply acting to obtain the best terms possible
for itself, and this ruling appears justified because the petitioner
lacked proof of favoritism. But it is apparent that drawing narrow
specifications is a relatively simple collusive method of lessening
competition.
On the other hand, specifications in an RFP can be too indefinite. This also presents the possibility of collusion, because a pro'46 Id. 621, 625.
147 Id. 625.
148 See supranote 47.
149 See, e.g., International Telecommunications Systems v. State, 359 So. 2d 364,
367 (Ala. 1978); Fasi,56 Hawaii at 61, 63, 66, 527 P.2d at 1287, 1288, 1289.
110 99 Misc. 2d 198, 415 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
L51 Id. at 201, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 729 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the
petitioner claimed that the city "undertook no studies to warrant the security...
terms of the RFF." Id.
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curement official can lay out vague enough specifications to call one
company's proposal "responsive" and eliminate competing proposals
as unresponsive. 5 2 Indefinite specifications also tend to confuse
potential offerors, who may be unsure what the agency seeks to

procure.
Treading the fine line between too definite and too vague is
not easy. 15 3 The problem, though, can be addressed in several ways.
For example, although RFPs in competitively negotiated procurement are inevitably rather indefinite,ls a market analysis should
help to make them as concrete as possible. 55
2. Evaluation Factors: Disclosed or Concealed?
RFPs usually list the criteria by which the procuring agency
will evaluate proposals. The first question that has arisen is whether
the official must use all of the criteria listed or may base a decision
on only some of them. The second is whether the procurement official may use criteria other than those listed.
The first problem arose in Equitable Shipyards, Inc. v. State.15'
The appellant argued that a particular factor, life cycle costs, should
not have been used in evaluating its proposal. The court noted that
the appellant was disregarding the language of the contract award
statute, and added that the proposer knew the state's statutory construction because it was set forth in the RFP. 157 This was the only
principled decision the court could have made, for allowing procurement officials to pick and choose among evaluation criteria listed
1_31n

a somewhat similar case involving litigation over the use of an indefinite

RFP in a competitively bid procurement, the court noted that "the combination of
open specifications and the statement in the RFP that the [agency] could assign
various weights to the eighteen evaluation criteria freed the [agency] 'to select any

bidder it desired without reference to specific detailed guidelines."' Datatrol Inc.
v. State Purchasing Agent, 80 Mass. Adv. Sh. 299, - n.5, 400 N.E.2d 1218, 1223n.5 (1980).

The court also said that "the need for definiteness may even increase

when criteria other than price come into play and awards based on favoritism
become harder to detect." Id. at -, 400 N.E.2d at 1230 (footnote omitted).
153 Of course, if competitive bidding is chosen as the appropriate procurement
method, specifications must be as detailed as possible. See supra notes 41-43 and
accompanying text.

154 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. Cf. State ex reL E.D.S. Fed.

Corp. v. Ginsberg, 259 S.E.2d 618, 624 (W. Va. 1979) ("It was contemplated in
the Request For Proposal that the solution might very well entail a redefinition of

the problem").
155 Performance of a market analysis would also indicate that specifications were

developed objectively and not as a result of collusion or favoritism.
note 151 and accompanying text.
156 93 Wash. 2d 465, 611 P.2d 396 (1980).
157Id. at 483, 611 P.2d at 406-07.

See supra
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in the RFP would invite abuse. The official could make almost any
proposal look outstanding by emphasizing certain criteria that it
satisfied.
As for the second problem, allowing officials to use criteria not
set forth in an RFP also encourages abuse. In In re Honeywell
Information Systems, Inc. Protest of Contract Award Requisition
X-32,1"8 the court broadly construed a New Jersey statute authorizing
the state to award contracts to bidders whose bids "will be most advantageous to the State, price and other factors considered." 159 The
court interpreted these words to mean that a procurement official
60
,could resort to evaluative criteria not listed in the RFP.
This result stifles competition because potential proposers do
not know the bases for evaluation of their proposals; thus, drafting
proposals becomes very difficult. Both of these problems with evaluation criteria can be eliminated by the passage of state laws that require all evaluation factors to be fully disclosed in the RFP and used
in toto3 6 '

Another problem related to disclosure of evaluation factors is
whether these factors' weights should be disclosed.6 2 Nondisclosure
158 145 N.J. Super. 187, 367 A.2d 432 (1976), certification denied, 73 NJ. 53,
372 A.2d 318 (1977).
159 Id. at 199, 367 A.2d at 438 (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-12(d) (West
1955)) (emphasis added). The statute was subsequently amended. See NJ. STAT.
ANN. §52:34-12(d) (West Supp. 1981).
160 145 NJ. Super. at 199-200, 367 A.2d at 438-39. The court could have also
interpreted the statute to mean that RFPs can set forth evaluative criteria in addition
to price, but that procurement decisions must be based only on those criteria.
In Honeywell, the court permitted the state to consider one proposers "purchase option credits" resulting from a preexisting contract with the state. Without
those credits, this proposal was not the lowest priced bid; with them, it was the
winning proposal. Id. at 194-95, 367 A.2d at 436. The court later acknowledged
that "it would have been preferable practice under the existing circumstances to have
made some reference in the RFP to the possibility that purchase option credits
would be considered in evaluating the proposals." Id. at 205, 367 A.2d at 442.
161 Careful drafting of RFPs can also solve potential problems in the evaluation
process. In a recent New York case, the state Department of Taxation and Finance
issued an RFP for a contract to supply and operate an on-line computerized state
lottery system. The RFP provided that alternative technical specifications would be
taken into consideration in the event of a tie during the evaluation process. The
New York court upheld the use of this tie-breaking provision because it was disclosed as a possible evaluation factor in the original RFP. See American Totalisator
Co. v. New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 80 A.D.2d 373, 439 N.Y.S.2d 732
(1981).
62
1 See Femino & Smail, Disclosure of Evaluation Factors and Their Relative
Weights: A Continuing Procurement Problem, NAT'L CoNT. MoGT. J., Winter
1977-78, at 15 (concerning federal procurement, but analysis is equally applicable
to state contracting).
Besides disclosing relative weights, procurement officials should, whenever
possible, evaluate proposals using "objective measurable criteria." Objective criteria
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of weights increases flexibility in the evaluation process, 6 3 but at
the risk of arbitrariness and subjectivity. Disclosing weights fosters
effective competition by preventing offerors who are good guessers
or who have dealt with the contracting agency in the past from
gaining an advantage. 64 Disclosure may also reduce the number
and effectiveness of contested contract awards. 16
This part has examined state case law on RFPs and has pointed
out the need for legislative remedies to redress problems arising from
a fundamental misunderstanding of RFPs and IFBs; the hesitancy
or unwillingness to ascertain market conditions prior to selecting
an appropriate procurement method, and the subjective determination of specifications and evaluation factors. Part III assesses the
first comprehensive effort at legislative reform of state procurement
laws and regulations.
III. THE MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE

A. A Critical First Step
In February 1979, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association (ABA) ratified and offered to the states for enactment a
will generally be more relevant to competitive bidding than to competitive negotiation. See Crowell & Chierichella, Source Selection Under the Model Procurement
Code, NAT'L CONT. MGMT. QJ., Sept. 1978, at 13, 16-17.
63
'
See Femino & Smail, supra note 162, at 15. Cf. Datatrol, 80 Mass. Adv.
Sh. at -, 400 N.E.2d at 1222-23 & 1223 n.5 (example of nondisclosure of relative
weights in an 1FP). Some commentators argue that disclosure of numerical weights
does not limit agency discretion in procurement. Femino & Smail, supra note 162,
at 21-22.
184 When disclosure of numerical weights is prohibited, "procuring agencies
using numerical evaluation plans must subjectively convert the numbers into some
narrative expression" in the 1RFF. "Because the narrative language used varies
widely [between procurements], those offerors most familiar with the past practices
of a contracting ofice have a competitive edge." Femino & Smail, supra note 162,
at 21. "Since 1962, the Comptroller General has repeatedly stated that sound
procurement policy requires the disclosure of relative weights attached to evaluation
factors . . . ."

Id.

165 d. 21. Although this Comment focuses on disclosure during the RFP
stage of a procurement, written disclosure after procurement of the criteria the
agency relied upon in awarding a contract will greatly aid judicial review of that
procurement. See E.D.S. Federal, 259 S.E.2d at 626.
There are other ways of avoiding collusion and favoritism. For example, procuring agencies might require submission of price and technical proposals in separate
envelopes. The evaluation committee could then consider the technical proposals
separate from the price proposals. This method would ensure that each proposal is
initially judged on its merits. Or, the agency might disguise the identity of proposers
to prevent subjective judgments and intentional favoritism. See Nash & Love, supra
note 18, at 332 n.49. Both the federal and state governments have successfully used
this approach. See, e.g., Sun Ship, Inc. v. Woolsey, 484 F. Supp. 1348, 1350-51
(D.D.C. 1979); E.D.S. Federal, 259 S.E.2d at 622.
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"blueprint for improving public procurement." 111 The Model
Procurement Code for State and Local Governments culminates an
exhaustive five year effort to provide a sound legislative foundation
upon which states "can build and operate a modem and efficient
purchasing system." 1
The Model Procurement Code emphasizes certain fundamental
policies 168 that, if followed by state governments, would undoubtedly improve many archaic procurement systems. Some of the more
advantageous policies include centralizing the award and administration of public contracts, 69 establishing comprehensive and efficient
conflict resolution procedures, 70 and providing ethical standards to
govern public and private participants in the procurement process. 17 '
These improvements will enhance the integrity and accountability
of the state procurement decisionmaking processes, and will maximize the purchasing value of public funds.
The Model Procurement Code also authorizes the use of RFPs
in a procedure, similar to competitive negotiation, referred to as
"Competitive Sealed Proposals." 172 By recognizing the need for a
procurement method other than competitive bidding, 7 3 the. Code
represents a significant improvement upon state purchasing laws
authorizing only competitive bidding. The "competitive sealed
proposals" provision, however, contains several serious weaknesses
that, if left uncorrected, could result in allowing the negotiated
procurement exception to swallow the rule of competitive bidding.
B. A Critique of the "Practicable-Advantageous"Standard
A fundamental flaw in the Model Procurement Code's process
of "competitive sealed proposals" is the standard used to invoke that
'66 Hiestand,

supra note 10, at 6.

167 Press release by William Montalto, Project Director, Model Procurement

Code Project, ABA Approves a Model Procurement Code, for State and Local
Governments (1979) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
Recognizing the diversity of existing state procurement structures and needs,
the drafters developed a "model" rather than a "uniform" code. MODEL PnocuE,,mEr CODE, supra note 12, at vii ("varying organizational and political constraints
in enacting jurisdictions might require the adaptation of any proposed code to
particular state and local situations").
16 MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 12, § 1-101(2).
169 Id. §§ 2-101, -102, -201, -204, -301.
170 Id. §§9-101, -103, -201 to -203.
171 Id. §§ 12-201 to -209. See id. § 12-301 to -302, -401 (enforcement
provisions).
172 Id. § 3-203.
173 Sealed competitive bidding is clearly established as the preferred procurement
method. See id. §§ 3-202(1) commentary (2); 3-203 commentary (1). See generally id. § 3-203 commentary (3).
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procurement method. That standard permits the procurement
officer who "determines in writing that the use of competitive sealed
bidding is either not practicable or not advantageous to the
[State]" 174 to contract by using RFPs and negotiations. 175 The
"'practicable-advantageous" standard is very broad, and the statute
contains no clarification or qualification other than a reference to
"fegulations promulgated by the Policy Office." 176
The ABA's commentary offers some guidance in discerning the
meaning of the standard by including illustrations of how an official
might determine whether bidding is practicable or advantageous.
A particularly helpful one is "whether the marketplace will respond
better to a solicitation permitting not only a range of alternative
proposals but evaluation and discussion of them before making the
award." 177 But this is the Code's only reference to market conditions in connection with the decision to use RFPs, and it is not
included in the statute.
The "practicable-advantageous" standard is very similar to the
"feasible-practicable" standard adopted in federal procurements.1 8
Both the federal and ABA Code standards fail to state what conditions the purchasing officer should consider before deciding which
procurement method to employ, and neither standard explicitly
states that a market analysis must be performed prior to determining
the appropriate procurement method. Consequently, under both
174 Id., §3-203(1).
See supra note 16.
175 MODEL PnocuRnu'r CODE, supra note 12, §§ 3-203(2), -203(6).
173Id. § 3-203(1). The ABA approved a voluminous set of "Recommended
Regulations" to accompany the Model Procurement Code on August 2, 1980. The
Code by design relies to a considerable extent on these supplementary regulations

because they afford the Code flexibility and enable it to evolve as procurement
experience and governmental needs change. See id. vii. The need for flexibility
does not, however, justify the use of vague standards to guide critical decisions, and
the regulations' major shortcoming is that they fail to clarify the "practicable-

advantageous" standard. See COORDINATINC CoMIUraTT ON A MODEL PROCUREMENT
CODE FOR STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENTS,
REcommENDED
REGULATIONS
R3-203.02.3 (practicable), R3-203.02.4 (advantageous) (1980). Furthermore, only
the first commentary accompanying the regulations suggests any procedure even re-

sembling a market analysis.

See id. R3-203.02.4 commentary (1).
supra note 12, § 3-203 (1) commentary (4) (d).
78
'
See supra note 88 and text accompanying notes 86-93 (critique of the
"feasible-practicable" standard). The Code states that competitive negotiations
may be used when competitive bidding is "either not practicable or not advantageous." MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 12, § 3-203(1). The official
commentary notes that "both terms are used . . . to avoid a possible restrictive
interpretation of the authority to use competitive sealed proposals." Id. § 3-203
commentary (4). Thus, the Code's language enables an agency to choose competitive negotiation just as easily as it could under federal regulations, which mandate competitive bidding only where it is both "feasible and practicable," see supra
177 MODEL PaOCUnEMENT CODE,

note 86, allowing competitive negotiation to be chosen too easily.
88 and accompanying text.

See supra note
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standards, the scope of discretion afforded a procurement officer is
179
effectively limitless.
The difficulty of designing a workable standard is demonstrated
by considering the two rough drafts of the Code. Each draft contained a different formulation of the standard for determining the
appropriate procurement method. Preliminary Working Paper
Number One incorporated the federal government standard of
feasibility or practicability.1s0 Preliminary Working Paper Number
Two dropped feasibility from the standard and authorized competitive negotiations whenever competitive sealed bidding was not "practicable." 181 This formulation was fairly rigorous in terms of enforcing the statutory preference for competitive bidding, but was still
vague and was not tied to an analysis of market conditions.
C. Other Criticisms

Two other weaknesses hamper the effectiveness of the Code's
"competitive sealed proposals" provision. First, the Code defines
IFBs as "all documents ... utilized for soliciting bids," and RFPs as
"all documents . . . utilized for soliciting proposals." 182 These

definitions are identical except for the words "bids" and "proposals."
Yet a proper substantive definition of the RFP should recognize
that the document is the beginning of a process contemplating negotiations to clarify proposals prior to a contract award. This definition would help prevent confusion between the two types of procurement. For the same reason, the definition should emphasize
that the RFP is a request, not an offer, and that the issuer of the
RFP can change or withdraw the document prior to the contract
award.ls 3 In contrast, the IFB cannot, absent unusual circumstances, be changed or withdrawn after issuance. 8 4
179 O£ course, this discretion is limited by the federal regulations or the recommended Model Procurement Code regulations. But it is clear that no law limits
a procurement official's discretion. Because a state may adopt the Model Procurement Code without necessarily promulgating the recommended regulations, the
"practical-advantageous" standard may stand without qualifieation.
10 Coordinating Committee on a Model Procurement Code for State and Local
Governments, Preliminary Worldng Paper No. 1, § 2-105(1) (June 25, 1976).

But the commentary following § 2-105 indicates a desire not to duplicate the
competitive bidding exemptions in the federal regulations, stating that the statute
does not attempt to establish "a litany of descriptive circumstances that might justify [competitive negotiation]." The Committee believed that "any such illustrative listing.. . would not be appropriate." Id. § 2-105 commentary (2).
181 Coordinating Committee on a Model Procurement Code for State and Local
Governments, Preliminary Working Paper No. 2, § 3-203(1) (June 13, 1977).

182 See MoD lPnocuNuNr CODE, supra note 12, §§ 3-101(3), -101(5).
183L. Benowich, ,Damages Liability in RFP Situations 3 (June 27, 1980) (unpublished memorandum for the Corporation Counsel of New York City) (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
184 See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.404-1 (1980).
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The second weakness is that the Model Procurement Code does
not require use and full disclosure of objective measurable criteria
in evaluating proposals. Although the Code provides for the disclosure of "the relative importance of price and other evaluation
factors" in the RFP,1s 5 and limits the evaluation process to those
listed factors,lss the drafters did not read these provisions to require
disclosure of specific numerical weights. 187 In light of the need to
maximize competition, this approach seems insufficient. There is
no adequate justification for the refusal to disclose "specific numerical weightings" if the procurement officer contemplates using
them. 88
Furthermore, a statute that seeks the optimum benefits from a
competitive solicitation must require that only objective measurable
criteria be used in evaluating awards. Each factor should be assigned
an absolute weight and listed in the RFP to indicate its specific
evaluative significance to all proposers. For example, if an official
will rate the proposals to some extent on their degree of innovation,
proposers should know how much weight that criterion will carry. If
it is 20%, the potential proposer will spend less time designing innovations than if that factor will account for 50% of the total evaluation. If it is not possible to determine a factor's weight when an
RFP is initially drafted, then it should be made known to all offerors
before the procurement officer accepts "best and final offers." 189
In sum, the Model Procurement Code represents a critical first
step for states contemplating its adoption. Many of its provisions
will provide a sound legislative foundation for an effective procurement system. But wholesale adoption of the Code's "competitive
sealed proposals" provisions may result in a faltering first step. This
is so because the Code provisions increasing the discretion of procurement officials to elect the use of .RFPs instead of IFBs place the
statutory preference for competitive bidding in jeopardy. Also,
the provisions do not clarify the difference between the two
procurement methods, and do not require objectivity in evaluating
proposals. The effectiveness of these Model Procurement Code provisions is, therefore, subject to doubt.
85
MODEL ltocumEumNT CODE, supra note 12, § 3-203(5).
186 Id. §3-203(7).
187 Id. § 3-203(5) commentary.
'188 The Code provisions only partially redress the problem discussed at supra
text accompanying notes 162-65.
189"Best and final offers" or "proposals" is included in the Model Procurement Code, § 3-203(6), and in the federal regulations. See 32 C.F.R. § 3-805.3(d)
(1979). But see 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.805-1(b) (1980). The call for "best and final
offers" indicates that the negotiation process is over and that a final offer must be,
submitted without further discussions.
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IV.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION:

A

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Because of the current problems of state procurement and the
weaknesses in the Model Procurement Code, this Comment suggests
a statutory substitute for the Code's section 3-203 ("competitive
sealed proposals"), consisting of a definitions section and a replacement for section 3-203. This substitute, set forth in Appendix I,
will preserve the statutory preference for competitive bidding in
most state statutes and in the Model Code, and will make procurement more efficient when competitive negotiation is used.
The first subsection in section 3-203, "conditions for use," replaces the vague "practicable-advantageous" standard. This requirement seeks maximum effective competition, which the substitute
legislation defines at length. 190 Because the definition of maximum
effective competition contains 'several procedural safeguards,' 2 ' it
will be less susceptible to abuse than the practicable-advantageous
standard.
By its terms, the substitute section makes the presumption in
favor of competitive bidding 92 difficult to overcome. First, the
agency must conduct a market analysis focusing on whether the
procurement need can be articulated specifically enough to enable
a reasonable number of suppliers to bid for the contract without
needing agency clarification of any matter relating to the procurement. Second, the agency must reduce that analysis, 193 along witf
any decision not to use competitive bidding,194 to writing. This
will enable a reviewing court to better judge whether the procuring
agency abused its statutory discretion in choosing competitive
negotiation. 19

The substitute legislation also includes a safeguard against
the collusive drafting of specifications alleged in BusTop Shelters,
Inc. v. City of New York. 196 New York City could have asked
offerors how large a security bond they would be willing to post,
making the bond a part of the proposals. Instead, the city re1 90

See infra Appendix I (§3-101(5) of the Proposed Substitute Legislation)[hereinafter cited as Substitute].
191 See infra Appendix I (Substitute § 3-101(5)(a)-(b)).
192 See infra Appendix I (Substitute § 3-203(1)).
193 See infra Appendix I (Substitute §3-101(4)).
29 4 See infra Appendix I (Substitute §3-203(1)).
0 By design, however, the standard of maximum effective competition creates
a strong presumption in favor of competitive bidding, leaving an agency with
little discretion in its choice of procurement method. See Infra Appendix' (Substitute § 3-101(5)).
See supra text
19899 Misc. 2d 198, 415 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
following note 149 and accompanying notes 150-51.
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quired a minimum bond as a prerequisite to responding to itsRFP. The proposed legislation would treat such items as specifications,197 and would require those specifications to be drafted after
a market analysis had been performed and the procurement method
chosen. 98 So an agency, trying to defend its specifications against
a legal challenge, would have to show that a market study indicated
the existence of articulable reasons for the specifications chosen.
The Code's definition of an RFP was faulted earlier for its
superficiality. The suggested substitute clarifies the definition by
requiring an RFP to meet three conditions. First, an RFP will have
to inform potential proposers that discussions will be an integral
part of the procurement process. 199 Second, the RFP will have to
indicate that "the contract will not necessarily be awarded on the
basis of lowest price." 200 Third, the RFP will have to disclose
all the criteria, together with their absolute weights, that the agency
will use to evaluate proposals.2 °0
The inclusion of this third element in the RFP in In Re
Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. Protest of Contract Award
Requisition X-32 202 would have prevented the state procurement
agency from considering as an evaluation factor the "purchase option
credits" that. one of the proposers had used in dealing with other
state agencies prior to the issuance of the RFP. This would have
prevented that proposer from having a considerable cost advantage,
thereby eliminating the basis of the resulting lawsuit. Similarly, if
the state in Equitable Shipyards, Inc. v. State 20 3 had clearly indicated in its RFP that all the listed criteria would be used to evaluate
proposals, there could have been no argument that life cycle costs
should not have been used to evaluate submissions.
The proposed legislation also explicitly provides for the modification and withdrawal of an RFP.2 4 Thus, in Honeywell, after the
197 See infra Appendix I (Substitute § 3-101(7)).
19 8
See infra Appendix I (Substitute § 3-203(1)). Because one purpose of the
market analysis is to develop specifications, and specifications include the required
qualifications for potential contractors, the market analysis must define the minimum qualifications necessary to obtain responsible offerors. Any standards more
restrictive than this minimum level prevent offerors able to perform the contract
from responding to an RFP.
12 99
See infra Appendix I (Substitute § 3-101(8) (a)).
00
See infra Appendix I (Substitute § 3-101(8) (c) ).
The Model Code does
201 See infra Appendix I (Substitute § 3-101(8) (d)).
not contain these or any similar requirements. See MODEL PRocumRErT CODE,
supra note 12, § 3-101(5).
202 145 N.J. Super. 187, 367 A.2d 432 (1976), certification denied, 73 N.J. 53,
372 A.2d 318 (1977). See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying
20393 Wash. 2d 465, 611 P.2d 396 (1980).
notes2 156-57.
4
M See infra Appendix I (Substitute § 3-203(2)).
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state realized that one of the proposers wanted to make use of its
preexisting "purchase option credits" to decrease its cost proposal,
the state could have modified its RFP to include the availability
of those credits as one of its evaluation criteria. Then the competing
proposer could not have complained that the state used an undisclosed evaluation factor.
Proposed section 3-203(6) rectifies another problem, the unfair
advantages given to CDC in the American Totalisator Co. v. Seligman 205 procurement. That section requires "fair and equal treatment" of offerors "with respect to any opportunity for discussion
and revision of proposals." 206 The section would have also helped
to eliminate the question litigated in Waste Management, Inc. v.
Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling Authority,2 0 7 in which the state
kept wavering between using simultaneous and sequential negotiations. Simultaneous discussions with the various proposers, ending
when the agency called for "best and final proposals," 208 would have
rendered the procedure completely unambiguous.
Recognizing that competitive negotiation may not be costjustified for the procurement of low-cost goods and services, the
proposed substitute also sets a minimum dollar amount for any
competitively negotiated procurement. Below that amount, an
agency may not use competitive negotiation. Because allowing an
agency to change the cutoff would be administratively unfeasible,
state legislatures must choose an amount appropriate to the state's
size, the number and dollar amount of typical procurements, and
the cost of preparing and responding to an RFP.209
Finally, the proposed legislation's requirement that "objective
measurable criteria" be used to evaluate proposals is a significant
departure from the Model Procurement Code.210 Whereas the Code
notes that "[s]pecific numerical weighting is not required," 211 the
substitute provision, in its definition of objective measurable criteria,
stipulates that a "listing of criteria in order of their relative im20534 Pa. Commw. Ct. 391, 384 A.2d 242 (1977), exception* dismissed per
curfaz, 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 436, 384 A.2d 266 (1978) (en banc), aff'd, 489 Pa.
568, 414 A.2d 1037 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 109 & 123-24.
20

6 See infra Appendix I (Substitute § 3-203(6)).
This section closely tracks
the language of the Code proposal. See MODEL InocuRxu:urN CODE, supra note
12, § 3-203(6) and accompanying commentary.
207 84 Wis. 2d 462, 267 N.W.2d 659 (1978).
See supra text accompanying
notes 135-37 & 143.
208
See infra Appendix I (Substitute § 3-101(1)).
209
See infra Appendix I (Substitute § 3-203(2)).
210Compare infra Appendix I (Substitute §3-203(5)) with MODEL PnocunmET CODE, supra note 12, § 3-203(5) and accompanying commentary.
2 11
MODEL PRoCUmDENT CODE, supra note 12, § 3-203(5) commentary.
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portance" is insufficient. 212 As discussed earlier, disclosure of these
weights may limit flexibility in procurement, but this detriment is
outweighed by the benefits of increased equity and smaller chance
of legal challenges.
V.

CONCLUSION

State and local procurement expenditures have been growing
steadily since 1970, and will exceed those of the federal government
by an estimated $138 billion in 1981.213 The potential gain from
the enormous dollar volume of state procurement spending depends largely upon how these procurements are contracted for and
administered.
Few benefits and much waste will result if procurement expenditures continue to be governed by state laws dating from the
Depression. These laws do not take account of significant changes
in economic conditions that have occurred during the last fifty years,
particularly the increasing technological sophistication of procured
goods and services. These changes require an alternative to the
competitive bidding method favored by the drafters of purchasing
laws in the first third of the century. This Comment has explored
that alternative-competitive negotiation, the problems arising from
its present use by states, and the need for legislation to secure the
benefits that states and their citizens can obtain from its effective use.
212

See infra Appendix I (Substitute §3-101(6)).

213 Cuaummr Busmrss, supra note 1, at 8.
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I

PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR COMPETITIVE

§ 3-101

NEGOTIATION

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

(1) Best and Final Proposal-thelast proposal submitted by an
offeror, upon which a decision for contract award is based. No
discussions between procurement officers and proposers may occur
from the time a call for "best and final proposals" is made to the
time of contract award, nor may any terms in a proposal be
changed during that time. 214
(2) Competitive Negotiation-a government procurement process, initiated by a "Request for Proposals," which permits discussions
between the procuring agency and proposers. When a contract is let
by "competitive negotiation," the price submitted in the proposal is
not the exclusive factor upon which the contract is awarded.2 1 5
(3) Discussions-nonbinding negotiations between the procuring agency and a proposer. These negotiations are confidential;
the agency may not reveal the contents of any proposal or any matter
discussed. Discussions may be used to clarify ambiguities in proposals, fill in omissions, add to and correct specifications, determine
production capabilities of proposers, and determine ranges of quality
and costs. This listing does not imply the exclusion of subjects not
m2 16
listed herein.
(4) Market Analysis-an in-depth study of the competitive forces
in the particular market for the goods or services sought by the
government procurement agency. A market analysis is used to
determine which method of procurement is most appropriate.
"Competitive forces" include but are not limited to the range of
quality available in the market; the technological sophistication of
the procurement need; the degree to which the procurement agency
can specify the goods and services it seeks; the frequency of similar
purchases by other government agencies, either within or without
that jurisdiction; the number of potential proposers; the expense
of preparing a proposal; the possibility of collusion among potential
proposers, and the degree to which proposers can compete solely on
the basis of price. This analysis must be written and retained by
21 4

See supra note 189 & text accompanying notes 207-208.

2 15

See supra text accompanying notes 17-21 & 49-61.

210 See supra text accompanying notes 54-55 and text following note 137.
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the agency for a period of not less than one year more than the
statute of limitations applicable to challenges to the procurement.
It must also be available for public inspection. 217
(5) Maximum Effective Competition (MEG)-the ultimate goal
of any procurement, to be achieved by using the competitive forces
within a particular market to obtain, in terms of both price and
quality, the best overall good or service. Where the desired item is
readily available in the market at the desired level of quality, and
can be clearly and accurately specified, MEG can best be attained
through the use of competitive bidding. Where price, quality, and
design of a desired item vary greatly in the market, and detailed
specifications can be provided only after discussions, MEG is best
attained by competitive negotiation. The performance of a market
analysis will provide the information necessary to determine which
type of market the procuring agency faces.
As long as the procurement is publicly advertised, there is no
absolute duty to solicit every possible offeror for proposals. The
agency should increase the number of competing proposers only to
the extent that competition is effective to procure its needs.
Other aspects of MEG, with respect to competitive negotiation,
include the following:
(a) the agency must promulgate regulations detailing the
procedures to be followed in a competitively negotiated
procurement;
(b) these regulations should, at a minimum, guarantee
that:
(i) specifications in the RFP will be sufficiently detailed to give a proposer notice of what the agency is seeking to procure. But specifications should not be drafted so
narrowly that they effectively limit competition at some
intermediate stage of the procurement;
(ii) the market analysis will state how the agency
chose the specifications used in the RFP;
(iii) no action will be taken which will, directly or indirectly, prematurely limit effective competition;
(iv) prior to the call for best and final proposals an
agency will negotiate simultaneously, rather than sequentially, with proposers; and,
217
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(v) prior to the call for best and final proposals, all
parties may conform their proposal to the performance
2 18
specifications made in a competitor's proposal.
(6) Objective Measurable Criteria-specific numerical weightings which indicate the degree to which each evaluation factor
will be considered in a procurement decision. A listing of criteria
in order of their relative importance does not meet this require219
ment.
(7) Purchase Description-the words used in a solicitation to
describe the goods or services to be purchased, including the specifications attached to or made a part of the solicitation. Specifications are a description of the design and performance of the good
or service to be procured. In addition, specifications must include
requirements, if any, that proposers must meet in order to be con220
sidered responsible proposer
(8) Request for Proposals (RFP)-all documents, whether attached or incorporated by reference, utilized to initiate a solicitation
for proposals for a competitively negotiated procurement. The RFP
must include, but is not limited to, the following:
(a) a description of the competitive negotiation procedures
to be used and relevant statutory and regulatory references;
(b) specifications of the good or service desired;
(c) a statement explicitly declaring that the contract will
not necessarily be awarded on the basis of lowest price;
and,
(d) a complete list, together with absolute weights, of the
221
criteria the agency will use to evaluate proposals.
(9) Responsible Offeror-a person who has the capability in all
respects to fully perform the contract requirements, and the integrity
222
and reliability which will assure good faith performance.

§ 3-203

COMPETITIVE NEGOTIATION

(1) Conditions for Use When, under regulations promulgated
by the Policy Office, the Chief Procurement Officer or Head of a
218

See supra text accompanying notes 71-77, 98-101, 134-38, 140-49 and text

following note 139.
219 See supra text accompanying note 100.
220
See supra notes 41 & 149-50 and accompanying text; supra notes 151-55.
221 See supra text accompanying notes 49-61.
222
See supra note 46.
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Purchasing Agency determines in writing that the use of competitive
sealed bidding will not attain maximum effective competition for a
particular purchase, a contract may be entered into by competitive
negotiation. No determination to use competitive negotiation can
be made prior to the Chief Procurement Officer or a designee conducting a market anlysis. Specifications for a purchase description
shall be drafted after an appropriate procurement method has been
selected.
(2) Request for Proposals The Request for Proposals initiates
competitive negotiation and emphasizes that a contract will not be
awarded exclusively on the basis of price. The RFP is not an offer
and may be subject to modification or withdrawal under regulations
promulgated by the Policy Office. No RFP shall be issued for a
procurement of an item costing less than (minimum dollar amount).
(3) Public Notice Adequate public notice of the Request for
Proposals shall be given a reasonable time prior to the date set forth
therein for opening proposals.
(4) Receipt of Proposals After any proposals except the best
and final proposals are opened, the performance specifications, but
not the precise innovation, of any proposal may be disclosed to competing proposers only for the purpose of allowing those competing
proposers to conform their proposals. Under no circumstances may
specific price or design proposals be disclosed. A Register of Proposals shall be prepared in accordance with regulations promulgated
by the Policy Office, and shall be open for public inspection after
contract award.
(5) Evaluation Factors The RFP shall state the evaluation
factors as objective measurable criteria. The evaluative significance
of all factors shall be disclosed to all proposers prior to request for
the best and final proposals.
(6) Discussion with Responsible Offerors and Revisions to Proposals As provided in the Request for Proposals, and under regulations promulgated by the Policy Office, discussions shall be conducted with responsible offerors who submit proposals determined
to be possible selections for contract award. The purpose of these
discussions is to assure full understanding of, and responsiveness to,
the solicitation requirements. Offerors .shall be accorded fair and
equal treatment with respect to any opportunity for discussion and
revision of proposals, and such revisions may be permitted after RFP

1981]
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submissions and prior to award for the purpose of obtaining best and
final proposals.
(7) Award Award shall be made to the responsible
offeror
whose proposal is determined in writing to be the most advantageous to the State taking into consideration price and all evaluation
factors set forth in the Request for Proposals. No other factors or
criteria shall be used in the evaluation. The contract file shall state
the basis on which the award is made.
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APPENDIX II.
STATE PROCUREMENT LAWS

A. The following eight states have enacted Model Procurement
Code-based competitive bidding or competitive negotiation legislation, or both.
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-254 to -256 (1979)
Arkansas:
(both).
Colorado:
Indiana:

1981 Colo. Sess. Laws 1259 (both).
1981 Ind. Acts No. 162, Pub. L. No. 32
(Burns Advance Legis. Service) (both).

Kentucky:

Ky. REV. STAT. §§45A.080, .085 (1980)

(both).
Louisiana:
Maryland:

§ 39:1503 (West Supp.
1981) (negotiation).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, §§ 3-202 to -204
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

(1981 & Supp. 1981) (both).
South Carolina:

Citation not yet available.

Utah:

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 63-56-20 to -21 (Supp.

1981) (both).
B. The following state statutes authorize various forms of competitive bidding and contain no general provisions for the use of
Requests for Proposals or competitive negotiation:
Alabama:

ALA. CODE §§ 41-16-20, -24, -50 (Supp. 1981).

Alaska:

ALASKA

STAT.

§ 37.05.230 (1978 & Supp.

1980).
Arizona:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§ 41-729, -730 (1974

8c Supp. 1980).
California:

14335,
1980).
Connecticut:

§§ 14250-14275, 1429014780-14784, 14790-14818 (West

CAL. GOV'T CODE

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 4-112, -114 (West

Supp. 1981).
Delaware:

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,

& Supp. 1980).

§§ 6903-6907 (1979

.-1981]
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FLA.

STAT.

ANN.
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§§ 287.057, .062

(West

Supp. 1981).

Georgia:

GA. CODE ANN. §§40-1909 to -1913 (1975
& Supp. 1981).

Hawaii-

HAWAII

REV.

STAT.

§§ 103-22,-25

to -32

(1976 & Supp. 1980).

Idaho:

IDAHO CODE §§31-4003 to 4011 (1963 &
Supp. 1981).

Illinois:

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 132.1 -.9a (SmithHurd 1981).

Iowa:

IOWA CODE ANN. § 73.2 (West 1973).

Kansas:

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-3739 to -3741 (Supp.
1980).

Maine:

ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1816 (1979 &
Supp. 1981).

Massachusetts:

MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, § 22, (Michie/Law.
Co-op 1980).

Michigan:

MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN.

§§ 18.4(b) (1981),

123.501 (1967).

Minnesota:

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 16.07 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1981).

Mississippi:

Miss. CODE ANN. § 31-7-13 (Supp. 1981).

Missouri:

Mo.

ANN.

STAT.

§§34.040-.065

(Vernon

1969).

Montana:

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 18-1-102, -2-301 (1979).

Nebraska:

NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 73-101 to -106, 81-1118(5)

(1976, Cum. Supp. 1980 & Supp. 1981).

Nevada:

NEv.

REv. STAT.

§§333.290-.350

(1979)

(further amended by 1981 Nev. Stats. ch. 557

(Adv. Sh. Nev. Legis.)).

New Hainpshir e:
New Jersey:

N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8:19 (1971 & Supp.
1979).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:34-6 to -12 (West 1955
& Supp. 1981).
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§§ 13-1-9 to -13 (1978 &

STAT. ANN.

Supp. 1979).
New York:

N.Y.

North Carolina:

N.C.

GEN.

STAT.

North Dakota:

N.D. CENT.

CODE

STATE FIN. LAW §§ 163-164, 166-167,
174 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1980) (further
amended by 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 584).

§§ 143-52 to -56 (1978)
(further amended by 1981 N.C. Adv. Legisl.
Serv. chs. 602, 953).
§§ 5444.401 to -06 (Supp.

1979).
Ohio:

§§ 125.07-.11 (Page

OHIO REv. CODE ANN.

1978 & Supp. 1981) (further amended by
1981 Ohio Legisl. Bull. 12, 18-19).
Oklahoma:

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74,

§§ 85.3, .5, .7 (West

1965 & Supp. 1980).
§§ 279.015-.029, .035 (1979).

Oregon:

OR. REv. STAT.

Pennsylvania:

71, §§ 187, 1612 (Purdon
1962); tit. 73, §§ 1602-1604, 1622 (Purdon
Supp. 1981).

Rhode Island:

R.I. GEN. LAWs §§ 42-11-2(d) to -2(f) (1977).

South Dakota:

S.D.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

CoDimED LAWS

ANN. §§ 5-18-2 to -5, -7

to -9.2, -18 (1980 & Supp. 1981).
Tennessee:

§§ 12-3-101 to -103, -108
to -110 (1980 & Supp. 1981).

Texas:

TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.

Vermont:

VT.

Virginia:

VA. CODE

TENN. CODE ANN.

art. 601b, §§ 3.08.11 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (further amended
by 1981 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 546).
STAT. ANN.

tit. 29, § 902 (1970).

§§ 11-17 to -17.1, -20 to -21 (Supp.

1981).
Washington:

WASH. REv. CODE ANN.

§§ 43.19.190, .1906,

.1911 (Supp. 1981).
West Virginia:

CODE §§ 5A-3-3 to -5, -11 to -14 (1979
& Supp. 1981).

W. VA.
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Wisconsin:

Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 16.71, .72, .75 (198-1)
(further amended by 1981 Wis. Legis. Serv.
101, 115 (ch. 20, §87q)).

Wyoming:

Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-3-2021(b)(vii), -2021(b)(viii),
-202 1(b)(xiv) (1977).

